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CZECH PUBLIC PROCUREMENT:  
THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
Robert Hetterich
Introduction
 Since the transition from communism 
to democracy in the 1990s, the Czech 
Republic has been plagued with corruption 
scandals within its public administration. The 
government sector of public procurement 
has been especially susceptible to corruption 
due to several key vulnerabilities. Political 
pressure on procurement staff, the complexity 
of the procurement process, and insufficient 
oversight have all allowed Czech public 
procurement to fall victim to overpricing and 
unfair awarding of contracts. In 2008, for 
example, a large national government contract, 
the Ecotender, was created to organize the 
cleanup of pollution across the Czech Republic. 
When an anonymous whistleblower turned 
in the paperwork, the tender was found to be 
overpriced by several billion euros (“Hidden 
Costs”).
 In the past several years, the issue of 
corruption has become more publicized and 
visible among Czechs. This awareness has led 
to the rise of several Czech anti-corruption 
organizations, all having the goal of mitigating 
corruption in different sectors. Organizations, 
such as Reconstruction of the State (RotS), 
Oživení, the Center of Applied Economics, 
and several international agencies, such as 
Transparency International and GRECO, are 
addressing corruption and vulnerabilities in 
Czech public procurement.
 In this article, I first outline the Czech 
Republic’s current state of corruption and 
trace its historical roots in communism and 
the transition. After this overview, I analyze 
vulnerabilities within the Czech public 
procurement system and how they allow for 
corruption to persist. I then discuss what 
makes good anti-corruption policy and the 
effectiveness of current anti-corruption 
organizations. Specifically, I argue that current 
Czech anti-corruption organizations are not 
effectively confronting corruption in public 
procurement. Finally, I offer recommendations 
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on how these organizations can improve their 
efforts.
Important Definitions
 To analyze the situation of corruption 
in Czech public procurement, I first define 
the terms public procurement, corruption, 
and transparency. According to the Irish 
Environmental Protection Agency, public 
procurement can be defined as “the acquisition, 
whether under formal contract or not, of 
works, supplies and services by public bodies” 
(“Public Procurement”). The process of public 
procurement involves the conception of a 
project, the bidding (also known as tendering) 
for the project by companies, the choosing of 
a bidder, and the evaluation of the purchase. 
The primary goal of any public procurement 
project is to find the largest positive difference 
between the societal benefits and the costs of 
the project (“Public Procurement”).
 According to Transparency International, 
corruption is defined as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain” (The Anti-
Corruption…, p. 14). More specifically, 
corruption in public procurement would fall 
under “grand corruption,” which constitutes 
“acts committed at a high level of government 
that distort policies or the central functioning 
of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at 
the expense of the public good” (The Anti-
Corruption…, p. 23).
 According to Transparency International, 
transparency can be defined as the openness of 
public administration in making information 
and documents related to the procurement 
process available to the public and bidders. The 
process involves providing information about 
the entire procurement cycle as well as being 
clear and intelligible about the conditions 
under which the purchase is being made (The 
Anti-Corruption…, p. 44).
Historical Background
 In 1948, the previously democratic 
Czechoslovakia was taken over by Soviet 
communists and was forced to become a part 
of the Soviet Eastern Bloc. The communist 
rule forced the nationalization of nearly every 
industry, and a centrally planned economy 
was completely in effect by 1955. During 
this period there were virtually no public 
procurement laws in Czechoslovakia due to the 
shrinking private industry sector (Hobe et al., 
p. 152). As the private industry sector shrank 
dramatically, annual growth rates of industrial 
output fell from 10.9 percent in 1955 to 3.5 
percent in 1980, and Czechoslovakia lost its 
leading industrial status, much to the dismay 
of Czechoslovaks (Rosenthal, p. 38). Under 
communist rule, the Czechoslovaks lost trust 
in their government. Low-level bribery between 
small businesses became a common way for the 
small private sector to spite the government 
(Lizal and Kočenda, p. 1). It eventually became 
clear to the Czechoslovaks that they wanted 
to return to a democratic government and a 
free economy. The Czechoslovaks successfully 
broke away from Soviet communist control in 
1989 in a peaceful revolt known as the Velvet 
Revolution.
 In the early 1990s, the biggest problem 
facing the Czechoslovak people was how to 
quickly and fairly form a new democratic 
government and a free market economy after 
living under communism and a planned 
economy for 41 years. In order to establish a 
free market economy, it was first necessary to 
re-privatize industry, which the Czechoslovak 
government decided to do with “voucher 
privatization.” The first wave of voucher 
privatization started in 1991 and gave every 
citizen the opportunity to buy a book of 
vouchers that they could invest in companies, 
making them shareholders (Hanousek and 
Kroch, pp. 5–6). This method of privatization 
was initially well received because it was 
successful in quickly privatizing industry on a 
large scale.
 In 1993 the federal parliament of 
Czechoslovakia voted to split the country into 
two separate states: Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. Slovakia halted the privatization 
process for several years while the Czech 
Republic continued with voucher privatization 
(Hanousek and Kroch, p. 5). Several years 
after the Czech privatization was complete, 
voucher privatization was found to be a 
flawed system. There was no way to regulate 
the fair distribution of vouchers, and the 
process was not transparent. Consequently, 
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the privatization process resulted in a few 
investment funds owning two-thirds of all 
the private shares (Claessens et al., p. 1). This 
redistribution of assets provided a strong 
incentive for private interests to influence 
the government’s decisions in the process of 
privatization. Government officials took bribes 
to transform political influence into ownership 
that gave them an advantage in the new market 
economy. In October 1994, for example, the 
head of the Czech privatization agency was 
caught taking a bribe in connection with the 
sale of dairy products (Anderson et al., p. 32).
 During this period, the Czech Republic 
also began to pass its first basic public 
procurement laws. In 1995 the first major 
public procurement legislation, Act. No. 
199/1994 Coll.1, on Awarding Public Contracts, 
came into effect (Hobe et al., pp. 153–54). 
Unfortunately, this legislation was not able to 
stop the growing conflicts of interest between 
the Czech government and the expanding 
private sector. Corruption grew from low-level 
bribery between small businesses into white-
collar, systemic bribery and conflicts of interest 
with government officials. Several Czech 
military officers, for example, were charged 
with fraudulently awarding approximately 
$241 million in contracts between 1997 and 
1999 for airport renovations. The case was 
eventually dropped due to the statute of 
limitations expiring (Embassy of the United 
States, Prague).
 In 2004 the Czech Republic joined the 
European Union (EU). The nation then had 
to adopt new public procurement policies 
that met EU requirements. Since then, Czech 
procurement law has been amended many 
times, growing ever more complicated. As 
procurement law becomes more complicated, 
regulation becomes more difficult; and 
corruption becomes easier to hide (Hobe et 
al., pp. 154–60). However, in recent years, 
many issues of Czech corruption have been 
receiving more publicity, and the Czech public 
has become vocal about solving issues of 
corruption in the country. 
 1In this act 199 refers to the number of the act, 
1994 refers to when the act was written, and Coll. is an 
abbreviation referring to a collection of public procurement 
laws contained in the act (Hobe et al. p. 153).
Why Is Corruption in Czech Public 
Procurement a Significant Issue?
 The large amount of money involved 
with public procurement has made it one 
of the most likely areas for corruption, 
according to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Public procurement represents a significant 
portion of the Czech economy, approximately 
15 percent of the $208.8 billion Czech national 
GDP in 2013, the third highest percentage in 
the EU (OECD, “Size of Public Procurement,” 
p. 137). Corruption within public procurement 
allows for significant overpricing of tenders or 
the unfair awarding of tenders by government 
officials. From a purely economic standpoint, 
corruption within Czech procurement hurts 
both competition and economic efficiency 
(OECD, “Bribery in Public Procurement…,” 
p. 9).
 Another important effect of corruption 
is societal: corruption results in distrust of 
the Czech government. In the past several 
years, issues of Czech corruption have been 
attracting more publicity, and the Czech public 
has become vocal about wanting to reduce 
corruption. A perception survey conducted by 
the European Commission in 2014 found that 
95 percent of Czechs believe that corruption is 
widespread in the government, and a majority 
believe that corruption is the most important 
national issue (European Commission, 
“Special Eurobarometer…,” p. 6). The success 
of governmental policy is often dependent on 
public support (Page and Shapiro, p. 189). If 
the public has little trust in the government, 
then it will be difficult for the government 
to successfully enact and enforce any type of 
policy. For this reason, the Czech government 
must gain the trust of its citizens and confront 
the issue of corruption in public procurement.
Vulnerabilities in Czech Procurement 
Leading to Corruption
 There are several vulnerabilities in 
Czech public procurement that have allowed 
the spread of corruption. One example is the 
lack of professionalism and independence 
of Czech procurement staff. There is no 
legislation regulating employment in Czech 
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public service so procurement officials often 
are amateurs or politicians rather than 
experienced procurement experts (Bouda et al., 
p. 55). Having amateurs or politicians awarding 
tenders can lead to problems because there is 
political pressure on procurement officials to 
participate in corrupt practices. For example, 
when Libor Michálek became director of the 
Czech State Environmental Fund in 2010, he 
experienced pressure to manipulate the Prague 
water treatment plant tender, which was 
overpriced by over $157 million, in order to 
fund the Civic Democrat Party (“Case Dateline 
– SFŽP”). Michálek fortunately did not go 
through with the manipulation and reported 
the plot to the police. However, someone with 
less experience or someone more susceptible to 
political pressure could have been pushed into 
making the manipulation.
 Another major vulnerability within Czech 
public procurement is the sheer complexity 
of and lack of transparency in the public 
procurement process. Czech procurement law 
is complicated and sometimes vague, making 
it easy to hide conflicts of interest and bribes. 
With the procurement policy currently in place, 
tenders can be manipulated in many ways. For 
example, Czech law states that the expected 
value of a tender must be estimated before 
the bidding process. If the expected value of 
the tender falls below a defined threshold, the 
procurement official can autonomously choose 
five suppliers rather than providing open access 
to other companies. This rule leads to the risk 
of procurement officials pricing tenders just 
below the threshold, then choosing companies 
for the tender in which they may have an 
unknown conflict of interest. It was shown 
by Palguta and Pertold (pp. 24–25) that cases 
involving manipulation of tenders to purposely 
fall below thresholds is likely associated with 
favoritism and corrupt behavior. Issues such 
as this can easily be hidden under the guise of 
“adhering to formalities” or by not publishing 
the selection process for a tender. Citizens are 
allowed to request access to contracts through 
Czech freedom of information law, but these 
requests are usually denied on the basis of 
not exposing “company secrets” (Bouda et al., 
p. 68). Thus, very few can see the process of 
establishing a tender, bidding for a tender, and 
selecting a bidder for a tender. If very few people 
see the tender, then procurement officials do 
not have to thoroughly justify or document 
their decisions, making it easy to hide 
corruption without fear of being prosecuted.
 In the case of Libor Michálek, those 
involved with the corrupt procurement 
practices were neither tried nor convicted, 
highlighting the insufficient oversight 
and enforcement of Czech anti-corruption 
bodies. Because corruption cases in public 
procurement are often hidden or not well 
documented, it is generally challenging and 
expensive to investigate these issues sufficiently 
for conviction. In the case of Michálek and the 
Czech State Environmental Fund, for example, 
not enough evidence was gathered, so the 
case was permanently suspended, despite its 
seriousness (“Case Dateline – SFŽP”). Put 
simply, any control and oversight bodies that 
exist in the Czech Republic are not given 
sufficient power to be effective.
 There are two bodies that oversee 
public procurement in the Czech Republic, 
the Supreme Audit Office (SAO) and the 
Czech Antitrust Office. The SAO does not 
have enforcement powers and can only make 
recommendations. The Czech Antitrust Office 
has enforcement powers but has been criticized 
for being too passive when prosecuting cases 
of potential corruption (Palguta and Pertold, 
p. 6). Many Czechs are afraid to become 
whistleblowers due to the lack of protection, 
which can be seen in that Michálek was quickly 
fired from his position and attacked by the 
Czech media and the prime minister for his 
whistleblowing. 
Successful Anti-Corruption Policy
 In order to effectively deal with the 
vulnerabilities in Czech public procurement, 
more anti-corruption policies must be created. 
Elements of a successful anti-corruption 
policy are diverse and dependent on the 
situation of the country in question. Based 
on the vulnerabilities and history of the 
Czech procurement system, there are three 
overarching factors that have the largest 
influence on the success of anti-corruption 
policy. A successful anti-corruption policy must 
have support of the public, laws that concretely 
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and directly address the vulnerabilities, and a 
method of enforcement and accountability.
 Anti-corruption policies have typically 
been found more successful when there 
is increased community participation and 
support (McCusker, pp. 14–15). Companies 
and politicians can be held more accountable 
for their actions when put in the public eye 
and when pressured to enact/follow anti-
corruption policies. This factor is particularly 
important for the Czech Republic because 
Czechs currently have so little trust and 
confidence in their government (European 
Commission, “Special Eurobarometer…,” 
p. 6). Unfortunately, the Czech government has 
not yet been able to produce any significant 
anti-corruption reforms that are widely 
supported by the public.
 Frequently governments enact a policy 
that is not significantly different from what 
is already in place or simply do not pass laws 
that directly attack the source of corruption. A 
lack of effective legislation renders the entire 
policy ineffective at mitigating corruption 
(Heeks, pp. 2–3). Over the past few years the 
Czech government has enacted policies that 
have continually been deemed insufficient to 
address Czech issues of corruption (Group of 
States against Corruption, “Third Evaluation 
Round...,” pp. 6–7). The Czech government’s 
policies have thus far not fully addressed the 
roots of the problem, summarized in the 
previous section.
 Without a strong system of enforcement 
and accountability, companies and politicians 
will not be put under pressure to follow the 
anti-corruption policy (McCusker, pp. 14–15). 
In the Czech Republic, it is difficult to confront 
issues of corruption in procurement because 
the procurement process is opaque, and there 
is no institution with sufficient power to pursue 
possible offenders. The lack of a sufficiently 
powerful institution has made it difficult to 
enforce procurement laws, and as a result 
bribery and collusion remain a normal part of 
doing business (Palguta and Pertold, p. 6).
Current Efforts to Mitigate 
Corruption in Czech Public 
Procurement
 There are currently several organizations 
in the Czech Republic that are attempting to 
combat corruption in public procurement. 
These organizations can be categorized as 
large Czech organizations, small Czech 
organizations, and international organizations. 
If these organizations are to decrease levels 
of corruption in Czech public procurement, 
they should at least address the three factors 
discussed in the previous section.
A Large Czech Organization—
Reconstruction of the State
 RotS is a unified group of 20 different 
Czech nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
which all specialize in fighting corruption. 
While RotS was being formed in 2012, the Czech 
government passed a set of new, relatively strict 
amendments to the Czech Public Procurement 
Act. The amendments limited the ability of 
procurement officials to restrict competition 
for contracts and extended the obligation of 
contracting authorities to disclose tender 
information, among other things (Nedelka and 
Jandová). These amendments were expected 
to have a significant impact on corruption in 
public procurement, so public procurement 
was not explicitly stated as being on RotS’s 
anti-corruption agenda (Skuhrovec). The 
new amendments made improvements to 
the transparency of the Czech procurement 
process, but they still did not effectively deal 
with many of the other vulnerabilities in Czech 
procurement (European Commission, “Annex 
to the EU Anti-Corruption Report…,” p. 8).
 RotS is working to combat corruption 
by lobbying the Czech government to pass 
a number of distinct anti-corruption laws. 
Although public procurement is not officially 
on its agenda, several of the proposed laws 
for which RotS is lobbying will still have an 
effect on the major vulnerabilities left open in 
public procurement. One proposed law would 
require that public officials declare their assets 
upon taking office. Making public officials 
declare their assets upon taking office helps 
address conflict of interest issues in public 
procurement. Currently officials are expected 
to declare their assets, but the process is an 
unenforced formality, so the information 
reported is generally not accurate. As a result, it 
is difficult to know what officials owned before 
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taking office and what assets they gained while 
in office. By forcing procurement officials to 
declare their assets, it will be easier to know the 
ownership structure of companies and detect if 
officials are awarding contracts to companies 
of which they own a portion (Rekonstrukce 
Státu).
 RotS has also proposed a law that would 
extend the powers of the SAO. Extending the 
powers of the SAO would allow it to have powers 
of enforcement, rather than only the ability to 
make recommendations (Rekonstrukce Státu). 
This said, since the public procurement process 
is complicated with many loopholes and the 
ownership of many companies is unclear, it 
may still be difficult for the SAO to effectively 
enforce policies. In the end, the effectiveness 
of the SAO’s enforcement will hinge on what 
powers are given to it in the final version of the 
law. In addition, a single national institution 
may become overwhelmed trying to deal with 
every local procurement corruption issue.
 Another proposed law for which RotS 
is lobbying would require people appointed 
to state companies’ boards and public 
administration offices to be deemed qualified. 
Reviewing persons appointed to public 
administration helps to address the issue of 
“amateurism” of public procurement officials. 
Often, procurement officials are appointed 
as a political favor, and those appointed 
may not have appropriate experience. This 
lack of experience often leads to inefficient 
decision making and susceptibility to bribery 
and other forms of corruption. Reviewing 
these appointments would help ensure that 
procurement officials will be experts with a 
history clear of corruption (Rekonstrukce 
Státu).
 To date, RotS has seen three of its proposed 
laws passed by the Czech government, one of 
which states that procurement contracts must 
be posted online on a government portal. This 
law will give the public access to procurement 
contracts, making it easier to detect issues 
such as purposeful overpricing. However, 
the law does not address the overwhelming 
complexity of the procurement process, making 
corruption easy to hide, even if the final result 
is published. There is also no provision in place 
to ensure that all contracts are posted with 
accurate information (Rekonstrukce Státu).
 In addition to lobbying for its proposed 
laws, another goal of RotS is to involve the 
Czech public in its anti-corruption efforts. 
On its website, RotS not only writes about 
its platform and progress but also shows how 
every member of the Czech Parliament voted 
on anti-corruption laws. This practice keeps 
the public informed about what politicians 
are doing and puts pressure on politicians to 
support RotS’s goals (“Reconstruction of the 
State”).
 RotS has attempted to get the public 
involved with anti-corruption efforts, but its 
policies still do not address all of the main 
vulnerabilities in public procurement. The 
proposed laws ignore several vulnerabilities, 
such as the complexity of the procurement 
process. Increasing the power of the SAO would 
improve enforceability of national procurement 
laws but may still not be sufficient to effectively 
enforce laws against private companies and 
local procurement officials. Despite these 
shortcomings, RotS is the first large and 
successful group in the Czech Republic to 
put pressure on the government to pass more 
effective anti-corruption laws.
Small Czech Organizations
 In addition to RotS, there are smaller, 
individual anti-corruption NGOs in the 
Czech Republic, which specialize in public 
procurement. Although there are many such 
organizations, my analysis will focus on two: 
the Center of Applied Economics and Oživení. 
These are two of the most active NGOs in the 
area of public procurement corruption.
 The Center of Applied Economics, also 
called zIndex, is a Czech NGO that was developed 
in 2011 through EconLab, another Czech NGO 
affiliated with Charles University’s Institute 
of Economic Studies. zIndex monitors public 
procurement contracts in the Czech Republic 
and uses a specialized system to rate Czech 
public organizations based on best practices 
for public procurement. zIndex is driven purely 
by the data that it collects. The organization 
does not involve the general public with what 
it does, and it does not recommend policy 
improvements. However, the data are compiled 
into a database accessible to anyone and can be 
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used to analyze available information about an 
organization to try and detect corrupt practices 
(Soudek).
 Oživení is a Czech anti-corruption 
NGO founded in 1997 with an initial mission 
of promoting and developing sustainable 
transport. Over time, this mission became 
increasingly more difficult to achieve as Oživení 
ran into instances of corruption. As a result, its 
mission evolved from sustainable transport to 
anti-corruption. Although it is a relatively small 
organization, it is active in directly addressing 
some of the major issues within Czech public 
procurement. The organization has released 
several reports that thoroughly address 
the technical aspects of some of the main 
vulnerabilities in Czech public procurement 
as well as providing suggestions for possible 
legislation. After the amendments to the Czech 
Public Procurement Act in 2012, for example, 
Oživení published an extensive 75-page report 
analyzing the effectiveness of the amendments 
in mitigating corruption and suggesting how 
to improve the legislation (Kameník et al.). 
Oživení also tries to get the public involved by 
providing free legal services as well as public 
seminars to educate citizens about its goals 
(Oživení, p. 6).
 Oživení is primarily hampered by its 
small size. The NGO only has 17 full-time staff 
members, limiting the scope of the projects 
it can undertake (Oživení, p. 6). Oživení’s 
small size also makes it more difficult to put 
pressure on the government to develop its 
suggested legislation. The only major channel 
through which Oživení puts pressure on the 
Czech government is RotS, since Oživení is a 
member organization of RotS. However, RotS 
has its own set of proposed legislation separate 
from Oživení’s. As a result, pressure applied 
through RotS does not effectively motivate 
members of the Czech Parliament to pass the 
legislative suggestions of Oživení related to 
public procurement. 
 When outside organizations suggest 
and push for reform legislation, there is often 
a feeling of lack of ownership by members 
of Czech Parliament (Napolitano). A lack of 
ownership therefore gives members of Czech 
Parliament little motivation to support and 
fight for the legislation. As a result, even 
if smaller organizations like Oživení and 
zIndex consistently suggest new legislation, 
improvements will not be made if they cannot 
motivate the Czech government to develop and 
pass the legislation.
International Organizations
 In addition to Czech organizations, there 
are several international organizations that 
try to confront corruption in many different 
countries, the most prominent organizations 
being the Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO) and Transparency International. 
GRECO is an international anti-corruption 
organization established by the Council of 
Europe2 in 1999 with the purpose of helping 
EU members and the United States fight 
corruption. Every few years GRECO conducts 
exhaustive studies on corruption in its member 
states and releases “evaluation reports” with 
recommendations. Periodically, GRECO also 
releases “compliance reports” reflecting on 
how member states have acted on GRECO’s 
recommendations. Several of the primary 
topics of the evaluation reports have addressed 
corruption in public procurement. 
 GRECO works directly with the 
governments of member states but puts no 
pressure on the governments to adhere to 
any of its recommendations. Unfortunately, 
the Czech government puts little effort into 
following GRECO’s recommendations. This 
can be seen in one of GRECO’s compliance 
reports3 for the Czech Republic. The report was 
released in 2015 and concluded that out of the 
13 recommendations made in the evaluation 
round “only one has been dealt with in a 
satisfactory manner…” (Group of States against 
Corruption, “Third Evaluation Round…,” 
 2The Council of Europe is Europe’s leading human 
rights organization. The organization was founded in 1949 
to promote democracy, rule of law, economic development, 
and regulation. The organization has 47 member states 
(Council of Europe).
 3This was GRECO’s second compliance report in 
reference to its third evaluation round of the Czech 
Republic. The first two evaluation rounds were completed 
in 2002 and 2005 and looked at anti-corruption 
enforcement. The third evaluation round was completed 
in 2010 and looked at issues such as how to deal with party 
funding and conflicts of interest (Group of States against 
Corruption, “GRECO Mutual Evaluations”).
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p. 6). GRECO can make recommendations, but 
it does not have the power to enforce them in 
member states.
 Transparency International is an 
international NGO founded in 1993 to 
monitor and publicize political and corporate 
corruption. There are over 100 independent 
chapters of Transparency International, 
including a Czech chapter, Transparency 
International Czech Republic (TIC). Every 
year TIC releases several studies on corruption 
issues in the Czech Republic, such as the 
“Corruption Perceptions Index,” a large-scale 
survey of public perceptions of corruption. TIC 
also gets the Czech public involved with anti-
corruption issues through projects like PAKT, 
for example, which hosts debates, courses, 
clubs, and discussions about corruption for 
university students (“PAKT”).
 Although TIC has been in existence for 
many years, it has not been effective in reducing 
corruption in Czech public procurement. TIC 
itself does not suggest legislation for the Czech 
government nor does it actively lobby the Czech 
government, as some other organizations do. 
Although it disseminates general knowledge of 
corruption to Czechs, TIC’s lack of lobbying for 
specific public procurement issues has made 
it ineffective at getting the government to 
develop anti-corruption legislation.
Conclusion and Recommendations
 One of the biggest obstacles in getting 
successful public procurement anti-corruption 
legislation passed is being able to pressure the 
Czech government into passing legislation 
that addresses the key vulnerabilities in public 
procurement. While most organizations 
understand what the vulnerabilities are in 
public procurement and what can be done, 
they struggle with getting legislation actually 
implemented and enforced. The most effective 
way these organizations can constantly 
pressure politicians to support anti-corruption 
legislation is through a well-informed public. 
The public can put pressure on politicians 
through rallies, petitions, letter writing 
campaigns, etc. As such, the public should 
be educated about the current vulnerabilities 
within the Czech public procurement system 
and what is currently being done to deal with 
corruption in public procurement. The anti-
corruption organizations themselves should 
also be lobbying for anti-corruption legislation 
while educating the public.
 In addition to improving the public’s 
knowledge on the issues, I also recommend 
that smaller Czech organizations band 
together to form a larger lobbying effort, which 
focuses specifically on public procurement. 
One of the main obstacles for smaller Czech 
organizations is their size, which limits their 
public exposure and how much they can lobby 
for anti-corruption legislation. Although RotS 
does not have public procurement as part of 
its agenda, it is able to effectively inform the 
public and put pressure on the government to 
pass the legislation that it supports. Currently 
there are no other Czech organizations even 
close to the size of RotS that focus specifically 
on corruption in public procurement. The 
various smaller Czech organizations could 
band together in a similar fashion to RotS, 
pooling their resources in order to expand their 
capabilities. Rather than simply suggesting 
legislation changes, the smaller organizations 
can bring about more effective change by 
jointly lobbying for anti-corruption legislation 
and by educating the public.
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